Most sociological studies on the economic elite have focused on groups holding formal power in the economic field. In this paper, the Swedish economic elite is constructed in line with Thomas Piketty's notions on the richest top one per cent, but the scope extended beyond the economic analysis by combining it with a sociological perspective. Differences within this distributional group are found in the volume and composition of economic capital-as well as in other forms of capital. The elite is structured by an opposition between, first, those holding large wealth and those receiving high-wage incomes and, second, between the established elite and newcomers. Moreover, many elite studies pay attention to the routes to elite position. This paper also examines modes of reproduction from elite positions, using the education strategies employed by children of the economic elite within Swedish higher education. Such strategies are more important-and narrow-for the children of the high-income elite, revealed by their over-representation at certain highly selective educational institutions.
Introduction
Within the sociology of elites, most research has defined the elite using criteria of formal power as the selection base. In the case of the economic elite this would mean groups such as CEOs of large corporations etc. (cf. Hartmann 2000 , Ellersgaard et al. 2013 ). This inclination is perfectly aligned with seminal texts within the field (cf. Giddens 1974: 4, 12-13; Mills 1999 Mills [1956 : 276). This paper, however, instead turns the attention to a group defined by distributional criteria, by focusing on the most affluent in Sweden, thereby adding sociological reasoning to a sphere hitherto dominated by economic thought (i.e. the top one per cent recently made famous in Piketty 2014) . While the economic analysis stops after establishing the share of the total amount of income or wealth concentrated in the hands of the top groups, this paper utilises insights from Pierre Bourdieu among others to also shed light on their more sociological properties, such as the differences in the elite's internal capital structures-with regard to the possession of different kinds of economic capital as well as other forms of capitals. What is, the paper asks, the structure of the Swedish economic elite, when defined by distributional criteria? Although Piketty-and his collaborators-successfully have placed this group at centre stage for near global scientific attention (cf. the contributions in Atkinson & Piketty 2014) , little is known about who actually populate it (although there is an emerging literature describing such top groups, see especially Keister 2014) . And despite Piketty's efforts to show the re-occurrence of a 'rentier society', even less is known about how they have risen to their elevated economic positions (for an important exception, mapping wealth formation in Norway, see Hansen 2014) .
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the relative values of power resources holding currency in society at large and ultimately thereby perpetuate, adjust or transform the social structure (Bourdieu 1996: 264-272 ).
Due to the relational configuration of Bourdieu's concepts, a comparative perspective is presupposed for grasping the struggles over "the dominant principle of domination" (Bourdieu 1996 : 265 ,cf. Wacquant 1993 )-a perspective that Piketty, giving precedence to dynamics rather than structure, does not provide. In other words, since the field of power is populated by the holders of different kinds of power (capital), accumulated in various specific fields, the relative power of one kind of elite is impossible to impute by looking at it separately. Although the approach to analyse the structure of the overall field of power never was empirically pursued by Bourdieu himself, it has been employed in subsequent studies of Norway (Hjellbrekke et al. 2007 ) and of France (Denord et al. 2011) . In this paper, however, this comparative appeal is not fully realised, but only sketched, through a concluding comparison with a more 'cultural' elite, arguably inhabiting a position in opposition to the economic elite in the field of power. The main focus is, instead, to combine the study of the dynamics of power (Piketty) with an understanding of power as a structured order (Bourdieu) . This could be done by following yet another of Bourdieu's key propositions, according to which the groups populating the different sub-fields of the overall field of power should not be seen as homogeneous, but rather engaged in perpetual internal competition (cf. Bourdieu 1988; i . The test case in this paper is the economic elite, the holders of the largest amounts of the dominant capital in the This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in European Societies on September 5 2017, available online:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616696.2017.1371315.
"objective hierarchy of forms of capital" (Bourdieu 1996: 270, 331) . How is this elite being reproduced in contemporary Sweden?
Internal differentiations of the economic elite
From the nineteenth century and onwards, the economic elite has attracted a large sociological interest, providing theoretical points of reference as to what kinds of internal cleavages that could be expected to characterise this elite. Thorstein Veblen, for instance, articulated an opposition that since then has been frequently restated in studies of the economically powerful: the opposition between 'old' and 'new' money, the former being more prestigious than the latter (Veblen 1994 (Veblen [1899 : 17-19; cf.
McNamee & Miller 1998: 196) . Max Weber added invaluable insights to the understanding of the internal structure of economic power by distinguishing different kinds of proprietors: those passively living off the interest of their wealth (rentiers) and those actively working to enlarge it (entrepreneurs) (Weber 2009 (Weber [1921 :
181-182). Following Weber, yet another distinction of relevance for envisioning variants of economic elite status could be made, between proprietors (owners; rentiers or entrepreneurs) on the one hand and the top ranks of the propertyless (salaried executives and managers) on the other, an argument otherwise perhaps most attributed to James Burnham, with his writings of a "managerial revolution", transforming corporate rule (Burnham 1941 
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sociological studies of such an elite have pursued when selecting their samples.
Usually, as mentioned, the selection is made with reference to the incumbents of formal positions of power in the economic field (e.g. top CEOs). As a consequence, structures of division of the economic elite that have been established in previous studies using positional sampling are less likely to surface in this paper. Bourdieu for instance, focusing his analysis on corporate heads, saw a principal distinction, due to the volume and composition of forms of capital relevant for the group between state and family bosses (Bourdieu 1996: 300-310) . When the sample instead is constructed to examine the wealthiest, this fine-grained distinction between different managers might not be as pronounced.
Recruitment and circulation
A common feature in elite studies is to examine the recruitment to elite positions, to discern if the incumbents are drawn from "all social levels and not solely from the ranks of a few privileged families" (Baltzell 2009 (Baltzell [1958 : 4, italics in original; cf. Clark 2014). . Baltzell makes an argument for the need of such an examination against the diagnosis put forth by Burnham. Since Burnham does not investigate the recruitment patterns to the new managerial positions that he highlights, the social ramifications of the process described are inevitably unclear: "if both the new managers and the old financiers are recruited from the same upper class, there has not been a corresponding change in the ruling class" (Baltzell 2009 (Baltzell [1958 : 34, italics in original). In other words, the examination of the social origins of the elite is pivotal in order to grasp the function of the elite groups in the reproduction or refurbishing of power relations. In a study of the economic elite, this perhaps becomes particularly important, since Bourdieu 1996: 278; Wacquant 1993: 22-23) .
Inheritance is also related to the distribution of power in society. In other words, inheritance not only affects 'who gets what' but also 'who decides'. To the extent that economic resources can be converted into political power, it follows that economic advantages of inheritance should also have political consequences. Political advantages permit those in power to create social arrangements most likely to sustain and expand existing bases of power and privilege, including mechanisms that permit transfer of privilege across generations. (McNamee & Miller 1998: 194) This could be read as a plea to include the volume and composition of inherited In elite studies, this arrangment, although theoretically oriented towards the future (in order to secure and advance positions), has empirically mostly been studied retrospectively. The most frequent social origins of inhabitants of positions of power and/or educational trajectories leading to these positions are used to assign a modal reproduction strategy to the elite group under study (cf. Hartmann 2000; Ellersgaard et al. 2013; Hjellbrekke et al. 2007: 262-263 ). This constitutes a major difference in the use of the concept of reproduction strategies from how it has been empirically appropriated within the sociology of education. In such studies, the strategies are The Structure of the Swedish Economic Elite
In the following section, first the distribution of the volume and composition of capital among the Swedish economic elite-defined in the manner described below-9 (35) is analysed and then the correspondence between this distribution and the dispersion of the elite children's properties is investigated.
Elite families
The economic elite under study in this paper is selected in a particular way that differentiates it from previous research. Second, there is a difference in the construction of the research object, due to the design of the study: households are examined instead of individuals and they are selected using a specific reference population. In Piketty's work, the group comprising the top one per cent is equivalent to the individuals receiving the highest incomes. Such a selection would however be problematic, given the sociological purposes of this study. Since the design, as mentioned above, is to analyse reproduction of the economic elite both retrospectively and prospectively, it becomes necessary to ascertain a basic comparability in these analyses. When defined in relation to the entire wage-earning or wealth-holding population, the top group can be of highly varying ages. Consequently, the adequate point in time to study their parents' and their children's properties would differ, making the educational trajectories very difficult to disentangle, due to the ever-changing supply of positions within the educational landscape.
The solution sought for the present purposes is a way of holding certain things constant. Since the analysis of the social reproduction expressed through the children's education strategies is of vital importance, this generation has been assigned the deciding role. To facilitate comparisons, only children born in a certain year, 1983, are included, or, more precisely, households with children born in this year. This birth cohort had roughly the same supply of education to choose from, 11 (35) making the meaning of their respective choices more comparable. Out of all children born in Sweden in 1983, the children with the richest parents were selected. In this manoeuvre, Piketty's distributional model was followed, although slightly modified.
If the parents combined (taxable) wealth or wages qualified them among the top 0.5 per cent in the distribution of either wealth or wages, the household was defined as economic elite, a measure resulting in a final population of 869 households. ii For this population, key information on the individual properties of the three generations has been added from various Statistics Sweden registers, the generations being linked to each other using the Swedish identification number and the register of family relations.
Construction of the space
The assets and characteristics of three generations are activated in the analysis: the grandparents (the first generation), the (elite) parents (the second generation) and the children (the third generation). Since the parents' assets are the ones that qualify the households as economic elite, they are the reference point in the construction. Their own assets are defined as their acquired capital, and the assets of the first generation are defined as their inherited capital. When analysed in relation to each other, different configurations of 'old' and 'new' (in a wider sense than just restricted to money) can surface. Into the space constructed by the distribution of these acquired and inherited assets, the properties of the children (the third generation) are projected, in order to analyse how the structure is translated into different modes of reproduction.
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The space is constructed using specific Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) (Le Roux & Rouanet 2004; 2010) 13 (35) several measures regarding the form of economic capital has been included-most nuanced for the second generation (the parents). A first distinction has been made between wealth and current incomes. For the first generation it was only possible to distinguish between wealth and wages. For the second generation, however, the wealth has been further specified. Solid assets (real estate, agricultural property, land, etc.) are distinguished from liquid assets (stocks and bonds, bank holdings, taxable insurances, etc.). The solvency is also assessed, by measuring whether the liquid assets are smaller or larger than the sum of the debts-the latter signalling significant labour market independence, since all debts could be resolved using available means were the mortgage costs to become overly burdensome, without being forced to liquidise any solid assets. For this generation, the income variables also include capital incomes (the sums of these are combined in the 'income' variable, while the 'income balance' variable accounts for their internal hierarchy). For both generations, the level of education has been included, as a measure of the holdings of a different-theoretically opposing-kind of capital (cf. Wacquant 1993: 23), further nuancing their capital portfolios. iii Last, to accommodate the circumstance that in this elite, defined in the manner described above, not all members are in 'positions of command' (Scott 1996: 40-42) as is the case when business executives are examined (especially since whole households are highlighted in this paper), some information on the parents' relations to the labour market has been included. 14 (35) been included. Second, a classification of their affiliations to different spheres of the capitalist economy-developed by Göran Therborn (1981) , although somewhat modified-has been incorporated. iv
The multidimensional view
The correspondence analysis yields three axes relevant for interpretation (see Table   A1 in appendix for eigenvalues and modified rates, and Figure A1 in appendix for the clouds of individuals in the factorial plane of the first two axes). In the following, only the first two will be discussed since they are most clearly related to differences in the distribution of the children's properties. In the subsequent figures, as given in Table 1 , the first set of characters in the value labels refer to the generation in focus (GP -grandparents; P -parents; some information regarding the parents is divided between F -father and M -mother) and the second set-when necessary-indicates the variable (for instance LA -liquid assets; E -education). Categories capturing information related to the second generation (parents) are black in the figures and categories regarding the first generation (grandparents) are grey.
The main opposition within the Swedish economic elite, summarised in the first axis (left-right in Figure 1 ) is dominantly related to the properties of the parents and pertains to differences in the composition of economic capital, related to the main source of economic revenue and position in the labour market (only categories contributing above average to the structure are displayed, see Table A2 in appendix).
This can be translated as a principal division between different proprietors to the left, both rentiers (with capital incomes exceeding their wage incomes -P-I: CapInc+) and to the left and successively smaller volumes to the right (P-LA: Small, P-SA: Small).
entrepreneurs (parents being self-employed or employers -P(F): Entrepreneur and
The pattern of combined incomes is somewhat more complex, where both the highest and the lowest (in this specific context, one must add) are found to the left (P- 16 (35) high education (longer university studies-P(F)-E: High) located to the right.
Substantial educational investments are more important for entering the economic elite at the high-earning pole than the pole marked by great wealth. The second axis (top-bottom in Figure 2 ) is primarily related to differences in the general volume of capital, showing the importance of intergenerational transfers by emphasising the close relations between the volume of inherited and acquired capital (again, only categories contributing more than average are displayed, see Table A3 in 1080/14616696.2017.1371315. 17 (35) appendix). Going from the bottom to the top, the volume of all kinds of inherited capital is rising. At the very top, grandparents with the largest incomes (GP-I: Top1) and the greatest wealth (GP-W: Top1) are found as well as the most highly educated grandparents (GP-E: High+-revealing a pattern of homogamy between elite parents both originating in highly educated households), while the opposite profiles are found at the bottom (lower grandparental incomes, wealth and educational levels).
The distribution of several acquired resources in the second generation follows suit, with small volumes at the bottom (e.g. P-I: Small; P-LA: Small) and large volumes at the top (e.g. P-I: Large; P-LA: Large). This axis expresses more clearly than the first the opposition between old and new, and shows the close interrelations between different kinds of capitals in this respect. 
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to the reproductive sector (P(F): Repr.sect) that seems to harbour the established elite (a circumstance that could constitute a legitimacy problem for a state that for the most part of the twentieth century was ruled by social democrats, since the state during this century appropriated most of the reproductive functions). The structure of the space in these two axes bears a close resemblance to that recently disclosed for wealthy business executives in Norway, although the relation between the axes are inversed in that analysis: with inherited capital primarily related to the first axis and the composition of capital related to the second (Flemmen 2012 ).
To simplify the pattern thus revealed, and clarify the interpretation of the structure detected by the correspondence analysis, the typology in Figure 3 is instructive.
Here, the Swedish economic elite is divided into four fractions, corresponding to the four quadrants in Figures 1 and 2 . The two most important dimensions of the space constructed by the distribution of capitals and properties in this extremely wellendowed group could be labelled, first, the composition of economic capital (where an asset structure dominated by wealth is separated from the one dominated by wages) and, second, the seniority within the elite (separating established members from new recruits). 
Different Modes of Reproduction
Then what about the children, the third generation in the analysis? In what way is the distribution of their properties related to the internal differentiations of the Swedish economic elite, described above? In the following, this will be discussed.
First, their basic properties is described, displaying their educational capital accumulated in upper secondary education and their own financial means, and, second, their major investments in Swedish higher education is revealed (i.e. the educational programme where they spent the most time). 
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The properties of the third generation
The logic of the distribution of the children's properties in the space of the economic elite is consistent with the overall structure of this space (see Figure 4) . Consequently, 
The family and the school
The distribution of the properties discussed above is naturally related to if and where the children enter higher education, but the examination of this reveals additional layers in the use that different fractions of the Swedish economic elite make of the higher education system ( Figure 5 ). It should perhaps be repeated that the location of these choices in the figure is exclusively decided by the structure of the acquired and inherited assets of their parents, and not at all by their own scholastic merits. In that sense, they are rather to be interpreted as strategies of the families than of the individuals. vi
Three observations regarding the distribution of educational choices should be made.
First, the educational programmes located at the centre, or near the centre of the space are either typical for the entire group or non-distinctive for any specific subgroup-in the plane of the first two axes. The least distinctive educational choice in this population is Economics (in which all economic tracks, such as business studies, economics, finance and accounting have been included-at all Swedish universities except the Stockholm School of Economics (SSE), discussed separately in the following). This category is also the singular most common choice made by the children of the economic elite (a total of 147-or 16.9 per cent-of the children of the elite choose this field of study, see Table A4 in appendix for the absolute and relative frequencies of the educational choices plotted in the figure) . Although Economics in this wide sense is a frequent choice also among other students within Swedish higher education, the corresponding representation at these kinds of educations among individuals born the same year as the elite children (1983) 24 (35) per cent). This heightened and unison interest for studies towards the economic domains thus points to the fact that the well-endowed households under study have vested interests in the functioning of the economic field. 480-486). In this matter, the children of the economic elite are not that different from less wealthy children. However, along the first axis that separates households with large wealth from households dependent on wage incomes, a more elite-specific pattern emerges.
The dispersion over the first axis shows the distance in this space between on the one hand highly selective professional programmes (the mentioned SSE and Med. School but also also Law and Journalism) and substantially less selective but traditional academic studies (the social and natural sciences-SocSci and NatSci) (to the right) and on the other hand both one particular professional programme (Agriculture) and also to some extent less selective programmes cultivating a more general cultural capital (history and philosophy-Hist./Phil.
-and Teaching).
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in European Societies on September 5 2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14616696.2017.1371315.
(35)
The pattern in fact only assigns one out of the four labelled fractions a distinctive education strategy: the children of the State Nobility overly invest at highly selective and competitive programs, especially the Medical Schools, but also the SSE. This is illustrative of their relative position in the space of the economic elite, a position that appears to be populated by dynasties of high-earning professionals that owe their position to substantial acquired educational merits. The extreme position of the Agricult. category on the other side of the axis could also be seen as distinctivealthough non-assignable to either of the two propertied groups-if this realised strategy is interpreted not as a school-mediated reproduction strategy, but rather as an expression of a 'family mode of reproduction,' in which all strategies are "subordinated to the strictly economic strategies aimed at ensuring the reproduction of its economic capital" (Bourdieu 1996: 279) . To test what such an approach could generate, Table 2 compares-in a crude manner-the economic elite's relation to higher education with that of an academic elite's (composed of all children, born the same year as the children of the economic elite into families where at least one parent held a PhD degree-resulting in a group of roughly the same size as the discussed economic elite, 862 households) and with all children born in the same year (Melldahl 2015: 211-213) . Three sets of figures are compared: the proportion of the children enrolling in higher education (before 27 years of age) and the enrolment rates at the most selective educational institutions, 28 (35) the SSE and the Medical programmes (the rates at these selective institutions standardised to per thousand, to enhance the comparability between the groups). As seen in Table 2 , children from both elites are vastly overrepresented at both these institutions, but in a diverging manner. Even though the children of the academic elite are a rather common sight at the SSE, the children of the economic elite far exceed their representation by being more than 10 times over-represented (1,105 per cent). In the same way, the children of the academic elite at the SSE outnumber the children of the economic elite at the medical schools: 1 in 10 end up at such an institution, as compared to 1 in 80 among all children born the same year (an overrepresentation equalling almost 750 per cent). There are, apparently, differences in how different elites make use of the education system, related to their principal source of social power.
But the table also provides a certain urgent sense of proportions. Children of the elites evidently enter higher education in far greater proportion than 'average' children of the same age. For the academic elite, this eagerness is understandable.
Bourdieu argues that an agent's eagerness to invest in education is related to "the 29 (35) degree to which her social success depends on her academic success" (Bourdieu 1996: 276) , which would be especially true for a group highly dependent on the education system. But it is noteworthy that children from households extremely rich in the dominant form of capital in capitalist societies (the children of the economic elite) also deem it necessary, or relevant, to engage in higher studies in such great numbers.
The dramatic overrepresentation of the elite children at the two institutions are Table A4 in appendix). capital". In this way, a sociological perspective is added to Piketty's economic analysis and an economic dimension is added to Bourdieu's sociological concepts.
Summary and conclusions
The correspondence analysis of the distribution of capitals and properties within the top wealthiest one per cent in Sweden showed that this distributional group is marked by strong internal differences. The analysis revealed a structure of oppositions along two main dimensions. The first was related to differences in the composition of economic capital. Here, an opposition between holders of great wealth and receivers of large wage emerged, the latter more indebted both to the financial market and to the education system and hence much more dependent on outcomes from the labour market for maintaining their position. This effectively illustrates the power balance between the propertied and the propertyless, as articulated by Weber.
By combining a sociology of elites with a sociology of education, the intergenerational transfer of privileges was examined over three generations. If such privileges are transferred, the elite could over time arguably develop into a class (cf. 31 (35) reproduction-inherited wealth in the first case, intense educational investments in the latter.
The distribution of capital in the third generation indicated a large degree of elitespecific social reproduction. The children of the State Nobility were on average more highly appreciated by the evaluative functions of the education system and the children of the Rentiers were the richest in monetary terms. When looking at this group, the 'rentier society' has not returned but has rather been in place for some time, effectively transferring privileges across generations, reproducing both 'economic' and 'educational' dynasties.
That there are strong ties between the economic elite and the economic field was made evident by the fact that studies in Economics was the most common education 
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